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Charitable Contributions as a Condition of Federal
Probation for Corporate Defendants: A
Controversial Sanction Under New Law
Corporate criminal defendants' pose unique sentencing
problems.2 Courts and commentators have struggled with sentenc-
ing these statutory entities that have "no soul to damn, no body to
kick." 3 Traditionally, courts have imposed fines, 4 but this has been
criticized as ineffective.5 When the fine is less than the revenue
gained from the criminal violation, a corporation may regard it as a
cost of doing business. 6 When the fine is large enough to hurt, a
corporation may pass it on to shareholders by reducing dividends
or to consumers by increasing prices. 7
Seeking alternative corporate sanctions, courts turned to pro-
bation.8 While probation has gained acceptance as a corporate
1 This note focuses on sentencing corporate entities found guilty of criminal conduct.
Frequently, individual corporate directors, officers, or employees are joined as co-defend-
ants in corporate criminal cases. The sentencing of these natural person defendants is be-
yond the scope of this note.
2 See generally Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick " An Unscandalized Inquiry Into
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Coffee,
"No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick"]; Coffee, Making the Punishment Fit the Corporation: The
Problems of Finding an Optimal Corporation Criminal Sanction, 1 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 3 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as Coffee, Making the Punishment Fit the Corporation]; McAdams, The Appropriate
Sanctions for Corporate Criminal Liability: An Eclectic Alternative, 46 CIN. L. REV. 989 (1977);
Comment, Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Illegality, 69J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 40 (1978);
Note, Structural Crime and Institutional Rehabilitation: A New Approach to Corporate Sentencing, 89
YALE L.J. 353 (1979).
3 Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick," supra note 2.
4 While a fine has been the traditional corporate sanction, commentators have sug-
gested that it is possible to "imprison" or to "execute" organizational defendants. A cor-
porate defendant could be "imprisoned" by suspending its right to engage in interstate or
foreign commerce for a term. A corporate defendant could be "executed" by revoking its
charter. Commentators recognize, however, that corporate "imprisonment" or "execu-
tion" is impracticable. See Comment, supra note 2, at 54; Note, supra note 2, at 373 n.1 19.
5 See Shaw, Charity Beneficiary of Judge's Justice, L.A. Times, Apr. 17, 1980, Part 1, at 4,
col. 2 (U.S. DistrictJudge Winner's rationale for ordering Eason Oil Co. to donate $25,000
and "business counseling" service to a financially troubled Denver shelter for battered
wives after Eason pleaded guilty to attempting to rig a lottery for federal oil and gas leases).
See generally Note, supra note 2.
6 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2, 79 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 225]; see also Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to
Kick," supra note 2, at 449; Note, Corporate Probation Conditions: Judicial Creativity or Abuse of
Discretion?, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 637, 639 (1984); Comment, supra note 2, at 48.
7 See Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick," supra note 2, at 401-02; Comment,
United States v. William Anderson Co.: "Crime in the Suites" Alternative Sentencing of Corporate De-
fendants, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1025, 1029 (1983); Note, supra note 6, at 640; Comment,
supra note 2, at 52, 58; Note, supra note 2, at 362-63.
8 Federal courts are empowered to grant probation solely by statute. United States v.
sanction, imposing charitable contributions9 as a condition of that
probation has sparked debate.10 Can federal courts legally impose
charitable contributions as a condition of probation for corporate
defendants? If so, are there cases in which this may be a particu-
Cohen, 617 F.2d 56, 58, 59 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845 (1980); United States v.
Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 918 (1968), reh'g denied, 399
U.S. 917 (1970); see also Exparte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916).
Although the Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982), did not explicitly state
that corporate defendants were subject to probation, courts have held that corporate de-
fendants can be placed on probation. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58
(7th Cir. 1972); United States v. J.C. Ehrlich Co., 372 F. Supp. 768 (D. Md. 1974). In
Atlantic Richfield, the corporate defendant illegally discharged oil from its Stickney, Illinois
dock facility into the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal. Upon conviction for violating 33
U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (1964), the defendant was fined and placed on probation for six
months. The conditions of probation required the defendant to "set up and complete a
program within [45] days to handle oil spillage into the soil and/or stream." 465 F.2d at
61. If the defendant failed to comply, the court would appoint a Special Probation Officer
with powers of a trustee. The defendant appealed the sentence. The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed placing the corporation on probation, but reversed the condi-
tions of probation as unreasonable. 465 F.2d at 61. In Ehrlich, the corporate defendant
pleaded nolo contendere to ten counts of violating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 703-11 (1969). The court fined Ehrlich Co. and placed it on five years probation,
conditioned on no further convictions for violating any federal preservation of wildlife stat-
utes. See generally Recent Developments, The Application of the Federal Probation Act to the Corpo-
rate Entity. United States v. Atlantic Richfield, 465 F.2d 58 (1972), 3 U. BALT. L. REV. 294
(1974).
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 affirms this judicial interpretation by explicitly
stating that organizations may be sentenced to probation. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1987, 1988 (to
be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3551(c)(1)) [hereinafter cited as Sentencing Reform Act].
9 The charitable contributions in question are those paid to charities that have not
been directly harmed by the corporation's criminal conduct. A charity directly harmed by
the corporation's conduct can be paid restitution under the Federal Probation Act. 18
U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which repeals 18 U.S.C.
§ 3651, effective November 1, 1986, also allows restitution to victims of the offense. Sen-
tencing Reform Act, supra note 8, at 1993 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(3)).
This note distinguishes between a corporate defendant funding community service
projects by contributing money and performing community service by contributing labor and
materials. A court ordered charitable contributions of corporate defendants' labor and
materials in a bakery industry Sherman Act price fixing case. United States v. Danilow
Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1163-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); cf. United States v. Borden, 74
Crim. 0319 (D. Ariz. 1975) (court delayed sentencing, suggesting that milk companies
guilty of price fixing donate milk to charities in order to mitigate amount of punishment to
be imposed at subsequent sentencing date). Courts which have challenged monetary chari-
table contributions have explicitly stated that they do not question corporations performing
community service as a condition of probation. United States v. John Scher Presents, Inc.,
746 F.2d 959, 962-63 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d
1542, 1550 (8th Cir. 1984). See notes 22-23 infra. This note focuses on monetary charitable
contributions.
10 See generally Comment, supra note 7; Note, supra note 6; Comment, United States v.
William Anderson Co.: Monetary Conditons of Probation Under the Federal Probation Act, 69 IowA L.
REV. 1147 (1984); Note, Corporate Contributions to Charity as a Condition of Probation Under the
Federal Probation Act, 9J. CORP. L. 241 (1984); Comment, Corporations and the Federal Probation
Act-Is the Community an Aggrieved Party?: United States v. William Anderson Co., 58 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 163 (1983).
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larly appropriate sanction? Consider the hypothetical case of Con-
glomerate Corporation.
Conglomerate Corporation has been convicted of violating
both the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Clean Air
Act. Evidence at trial showed that the Foods Division of Conglom-
erate Corporation had used a compound to create a glittery surface
on its star-shaped breakfast cereal in violation of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act. This compound had been used for two
years to increase the product's appeal among its target market:
children between the ages of three and thirteen. Further evidence
revealed that Conglomerate Corporation had violated the Clean Air
Act because the plant's particulate discharge exceeded the statutory
limit. The Foods Division exhaust system had been inadequate to
capture the residue of this compound before it escaped into the
atmosphere. Medical evidence indicated that this compound is car-
cinogenic both when ingested and when inhaled.
Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,11 a federal judge
faced with the difficult task of sentencing Conglomerate Corpora-
tion has several options. 12 The Act presumes restitution to vic-
tims, i3 but how can the court ever accurately identify all those who
had eaten the cereal or inhaled the plant's exhaust? How can the
court provide compensation when that percentage of victims who
will actually develop cancer may not exhibit symptoms for years?
What sanction or combination of sanctions will meet the Act's goals
of sentencing?14
Part I of this note takes an historic look at the debate on the
legality of corporate charitable contributions as a condition of pro-
bation under the Federal Probation Act. Part II examines the legal-
ity of this sanction under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Part
III proposes guidelines for the appropriate use of this sanction.
11 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 is Chapter II of the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98
Stat.) 1976 (1984). See note 45 infra for the effective dates of pertinent portions of the
Sentencing Reform Act.
12 The judge may sentence an organization convicted of a criminal offense to serve a
term of probation (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3561-66), to pay a fine (to be codified at
18 U.S.C.§§ 3571-74), to forfeit property (to be codifed at 18 U.S.C. § 3554), to give notice
of its conviction to victims (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3555), to make restitution (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3556), or any combination of the foregoing sanctions. S. REP. No.
225, supra note 6, at 169.
13 Sentencing Reform Act, supra note 8, at 1990 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c))
requires the sentencing court to give a reason whenever a sentence does not include an
order of restitution.
14 The Act sets forth the goals of sentencing: just punishment, deterrence, incapacita-
tion, and rehabilitation. Id. at 1989 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D)). The
legislative history indicates that while one purpose of sentencing may be more relevant in a
particular case, a judge should consider each of the four purposes when imposing a sen-
tence. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at .70-71.
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Part IV concludes that under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
federal courts can legally impose charitable contributions for cor-
porate criminal defendants as a condition of probation. Procedural
aspects of the Act can provide any potentially necessary safeguards.
In appropriate cases, these contributions may be a very effective
corporate criminal sentence.
I. The Historical Debate
The debate on the legality of imposing corporate charitable
contributions as a condition of probation has focused on the statu-
tory interpretation of the Federal Probation Act.1 5 The minority
position held that the permissive language of the statute' 6 indicated
that the explicit conditions of probation within the Act were exem-
plary, not exclusive.1 7 Proponents of this position argued that
three monetary conditions of probation were listed in the statute
merely to establish beyond question that these specific conditions
could be imposed.18 Because the statutory conditions were not lim-
15 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). The relevant portions of the statute state:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by
death or life imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses against the
United States when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the
public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the imposition
or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period
and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best.
While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defendant-
May be required to pay a fine in one or several sums; and
May be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for
actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had; and
May be required to provide for the support of any persons, for whose support
he is legally responsible.
16 Courts have considered the following phrases to be permissive language: "upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems best," "among the conditions thereof," and
"may be required." See, e.g., United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 914 (8th
Cir. 1982) overruled by United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir.
1984); United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 563 F. Supp. 213, 215-16 (D. Md. 1983),
rev'd, 728 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1984).
17 United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1551 (8th Cir. 1984)
(Gibson, CJ., concurring in result and dissenting); United States v. William Anderson Co.,
698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982) overruled by United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741
F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984).
Congressional approval of this view can be inferred. In the legislative history of the
Sentencing Reform Act, Congress refers to the specific conditions of probation listed in the
Federal Probation Act, stating: "These, however, in view of the broad general grant of
statutory authority, have been viewed as examples of, rather than limitations on, the kinds
of conditions that a court may place on probation." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 96.
18 United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 1982), overruled
by United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984). In Anderson,
corporate defendants were convicted in nine related antitrust prosecutions. The defend-
ants had engaged in price fixing by bid-rigging in the Nebraska highway construction indus-
try. Judge Urbom sentenced the defendants to probation. The probation conditions
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iting, according to the minority position, a trial judge had discre-
tion to impose corporate charitable contributions as a condition of
probation.1 9 Indeed, district court judges have seen this as an ef-
fective means of punishing the defendant because it achieves deter-
rence and, at the same time, returns something to the community
which has been harmed by the defendant's conduct.20
included installment fines with the proviso that defendants could elect to pay part of the
fine to the charitable organization for which its officers or employees had been ordered to
perform community service work. If defendants so elected, their fines would be pro tanto
reduced. The government appealed the corporations' charitable contribution option. (It
should be noted that the government did not appeal an identical condition imposed upon
the individual officer and employee defendants in the case although both individual proba-
tion and corporate probation are governed by the same statute: 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982)).
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court, finding Judge
Urbom's "carefully formulated scheme of sentences deserv[ing of] praise." 698 F.2d 911,
913. Two years later, in Missouri Valley, a split court overruled Anderson, adopting the nar-
row statutory interpretation employed by other circuits. See note 23 infra.
19 United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982), overruled by
United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984); cf. United
States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982). Defendant corporations,
Mitsubishi and two railroads, were convicted for violating freight tariffs, resulting in
favorable treatment for Mitsubishi. The defendants were fined and given the option of
probation. The probation conditions required the corporations to obey the law for three
years, to pay a reduced fine, to loan an executive for one year to the National Alliance for
Business and its Community Alliance Program for Ex-Offenders ("CAPE"), and to contrib-
ute $10,000 for each offense to be used for the CAPE program. Mitsubishi challenged the
legality of the sentence. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence.
The court held that it did not need to consider objections to the probation conditions be-
cause the fine originally imposed was within the statutory limit and the probation condi-
tions were merely an alternative Mitsubishi could elect to avoid paying that fine. 677 F.2d
at 788-89.
20 For example, in United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 563 F. Supp. 213 (D. Md.
1983), rev'd, 728 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1984), Wright pleaded guilty to Sherman Act bid-rig-
ging. District CourtJudge Young suspended a portion of the fine imposed and placed the
defendant on three years probation. As one of the conditions of probation, the court re-
quired the defendant to contribute $175,000 to Baltimore City Foundation, Inc. which pro-
vided a wide array of services to the disadvantaged in the city. Judge Young characterized
this probation condition as "Corporate Penance." 563 F. Supp. at 214, 216.
In United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648, 650 (4th Cir. 1984), the
circuit court quoted Judge Miller's reasoning from the unreported district court opinion of
the companion case, United States v. Mid-Atlantic Paving Co., (D. Md.). In Mid-Atlantic,
defendant pleaded guilty to bid-rigging highway repair and resurfacing contracts. The dis-
trict court imposed a fine. The court then suspended a portion of the fine and placed Mid-
Atlantic on probation, conditioned on payment of a contribution to a charitable organiza-
tion within Howard or Anne Arundel County, Maryland. The Fourth Circuit vacated and
remanded for resentencing. Id. at 654.
In United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 1982), the court
quoted Judge Weinshienk from the unreported district court opinion. In Prescon, the de-
fendant corporations performed post-tensioning, adding tensile strength to concrete dur-
ing construction of large structures. Defendants pleaded nolo contendere to Sherman Act
bid-rigging and related mail fraud. Defendants' fines were suspended if, as a condition of
probation, they paid reduced sums into the Registry of the Court to be disbursed by the
Chief Probation Officer to crime fighting programs. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed the district court sentence. Id. at 1244.
Some district court judges, convinced of the effectiveness of this sanction, have suc-
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The majority view, followed by the federal courts of appeals,21
espoused a narrow statutory construction. According to this posi-
tion, the explicit conditions of probation limited the general per-
missive language in the statute. 22 While these courts also viewed
the explicit conditions to be exemplary rather than exclusive as to
all possible conditions of probation, they held that monetary condi-
tions of probation were limited to one of the three types specified. 23
cessfully managed to "end-run" appellate review by suggesting the defendant "voluntarily"
make certain types of contributions either before sentence is imposed or before the time
when sentence will be reconsidered. See the cases collected at note 32 infra. Cf. United
States v. Borden, 74 Grim. 0319 (D. Ariz. 1975) (donation of milk to charities as mitigation
before sentencing). For insight into Judge Muecke's reasoning in Borden, see White-Collar
Justice: A BNA Special Report on White Collar Crime, 44 U.S.L.W. Supreme Court pt. I, Apr. 13,
1976, pt. II, at 10 [hereinafter cited as White-Collar Justice].
21 The Third, Fourth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits have specifically addressed this issue.
Each of these circuits follows the majority position at this time. See notes 22-23 in ra. But cf.
the holding in United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982), supra
note 19.
22 United States v. John Scher Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d 959, 964 (3d Cir. 1984). In
Scher, concert promoters pleaded nolo contendere to violating the Sherman Act by allocat-
ing exclusive markets among themselves. Upon the court's request for sentencing memo-
randa from the parties, defendants suggested a three year term of probation during which
they would contribute their "services and talents" to raise $100,000 for charities approved
by the Probation Department. The court, with slight modification, accepted defendants'
suggestion. The government appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, re-
versing, held that this sanction exceeded the scope of the district court's discretion. Id.
23 See United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1547-48, 1550 (8th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648, 649 (4th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 1982).
In Missouri Valley, the defendant pleaded guilty to Sherman Act bid-rigging of highway
construction contracts. During the case's complicated procedural history, defendant
moved that the court consider an "alternative sentence" in which the corporation would
make a contribution to the University of Nebraska Foundation as a condition of probation.
741 F.2d at 1545. The defendant-corporation suggested possible ways the funds could be
used. In response to defendant's motion, the court suspended part of the fine imposed as
sentence, placing the corporation on probation for five years. One condition of probation
required that the defendant permanently endow and support a chair in ethics through the
University of Nebraska Foundation. Id. at 1545-46. The government appealed this proba-
tion condition. The Court of Appeals foi the Eighth Circuit, in a split opinion, reversed,
holding that any monetary probation conditions must be one of the types enumerated in
the statute. In doing so the court expressly overruled United States v. William Anderson
Co., 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982). For a discussion of the facts of Anderson, see note 18
supra.
In Wright, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that "the district court
exceeded its statutory powers by imposing as a condition of probation the payment of a
sum of money unrelated to any legally determined loss sustained, to an entity not aggrieved
by the offense." 728 F.2d at 649. The Fourth Circuit emphasized that the district court was
bound by what it considered to be the Probation Act's limitations on restitution despite
"[t]he district court's disavowal of any reparative or restitutive purpose." Id. at 652.
In Prescon, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that since the condition
was restitutional in nature, it must meet the statutory criteria: " 'to aggrieved parties for
actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had.'" 695 F.2d at
1243.
Cf. United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Ass'n., 540 F.2d 1389, 1390
(10th Cir. 1976). In Clovis, defendants pleaded nolo contendere to violating the Sherman
Act in connection with retail prices of liquor. The district court suspended sentence for the
corporate defendants and placed them on probation for five years. The condition of proba-
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The majority position reasoned that these charitable contributions
were not fines because they were not paid to the government.24
These payments were neither restitution nor reparation because
the charity in question was not an aggrieved party that had suffered
actual harm or loss due to the corporation's offense. 25 Nor could
these payments be considered support because the corporate de-
fendant was not legally responsible for the charity's support.26
Thus, the majority position held that charitable contributions were
outside the ambit of the Federal Probation Act and, accordingly,
outside the power of the federal courts.
Believing that the Federal Probation Act did not grant courts
the power to impose this sanction, the majority reasoned that
courts which ordered these contributions usurped the legislature's
power to disburse treasury funds. 27 In addition, courts following
the majority position were apprehensive that this sanction would
subject courts to public distrust and criticism. 28 These courts ex-
pressed concern that courts were "ill-equipped to pick and choose,
among countless worthy causes." 29 They feared this charity selec-
tion process could subjectjudges to conflicts of interest.30 The ma-
jority view was unwilling to take the risks they feared the charitable
contribution sanction entailed because it had not been expressly
authorized by Congress. 3 '
Commentators have criticized charitable contributions as a
condition of corporate probation on policy grounds. The critics
suggest that corporate defendants receiving this sanction are "get-
tion required the corporate defendants to pay certain sums of money to the Curry-
Roosevelt County Council on Alcoholism, Inc. The Tenth Circuit stated: "We are com-
pelled to reverse the trial court's sentencing because we are unable to conclude that the
Curry-Roosevelt County Council on Alcoholism, Inc. or persons which it helps or repre-
sents were 'aggrieved' in the amount of $233,500 by 'the offense for which conviction was
had.' " Id. at 1390. The language quoted within the quote tracks the language of the Fed-
eral Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982).
24 See Comment, United States v. William Anderson Co.: Monetary Conditions of Probation
Under the Federal Probation Act, 69 IowA L. REV. 1147, 1153 (1984).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1549-50 (8th
Cir. 1984). The court noted that appropriation of federal treasury funds is a legislative
function. It reasoned that when a judge imposed a fine and then suspended that sentence,
he was in effect transferring funds from the federal treasury. The court stated the judge
was empowered by the Federal Probation Act to transfer those funds to the aggrieved par-
ties or to the defendant's legal dependents. The court implied that ordering the payment
of money to any other party as a condition of probation was outside the legislative delega-
tion of authority in 18 U.S.C. § 3651 and therefore usurped the legislature's power to dis-
burse treasury funds.
28 See, e.g., United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1984).
29 741 F.2d at 1550.
30 Id.
31 Id.
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ting off easy" 32 or are receiving a tax "break." 33 They also feel that
the government is being deprived of revenue when this sanction is
imposed.3 4
Although the holdings of the courts of appeals which have ad-
dressed this issue are in agreement, circuit court judges have not
unanimously adopted the majority view. For example, in United
States v. Missouri Valley Construction Co.,35 the majority held that all
monetary payments must meet the criteria set forth in the specific
provisions of the Federal Probation Act.3 6 Two judges, however,
32 See Stone, A Slap on the Wrist for the Kepone Mob, 22 Bus. & Soc. REv. 4 (1977). In
United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., [1976] 7 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 844, Allied pleaded nolo
contendere to charges of violating the Federal Water Pollution Control Act by discharging
Kepone and other chemical wastes into the James River in Virginia. Judge Merhige fined
Allied $13.2 million, but said he might reduce the fine if Allied made "a voluntary effort to
allieviate the suffering that [had] resulted from the contamination of the James River." 7
ENV'T REP. at 844. The corporation donated $8 million to set up the Virginia Environmen-
tal Endowment which funds a variety of conservation projects. Judge Merhige subsequently
lowered the fine by a similar amount. See Zim, Allied Chemical's $20-Million Ordeal with Kepone,
FORTUNE, Sept. 11, 1978, at 82, 88-89.
See also Tomasson, Olin's Arms Penalty: 'Donation'Plus Fine, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1978, at
Dl, col. 4; Editorial, Let the Charity Fit the Crime?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1978, at 28. In United
States v. Olin Corp., N-78-30 (D. Conn., filed June 1, 1978), Olin Corp. was convicted of
illegal arms sales to South Africa. Judge Zampano fined Olin Corp. $45,000 after the cor-
poration "voluntarily" established a $500,000 New Haven Community Betterment Fund at
the judge's suggestion.
33 Fisse, Community Service as a Sanction Against Corporations, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 970, 975;
Zim, supra note 32, at 89; Tomasson, supra note 32, at Dl, col. 5.
Under I.R.C. § 162(f) (1984), corporations may not deduct money paid "for any fine
or similar penalty paid to a government for the violation of any law." Corporate charitable
contributions, however, may be deducted within the limits imposed by I.R.C. § 170 (1984).
Therefore critics reason that suspending a fine and placing defendants on probation, condi-
tioned on a charitable contribution, "rewards" the violator with a reduction in income
taxes.
Despite the wording of I.R.C. § 162(f) (1984) that only penalties paid to a government
are not tax deductible, Richard Blumenthal, United States Attorney for Connecticut, has
speculated that the Internal Revenue Service may have discretion to disallow a deduction
for this type of charitable contribution. See Tomasson, supra note 32, at D1, col. 6. More-
over, this policy concern can be removed by the sentencing court stating that the probation
condition charitable contribution is not tax deductible. See Missouri Valley, 741 F.2d at 1545-
46.
34 See Editorial, supra note 32. Due to the current federal deficit, this criticism cannot
be lightly dismissed. It must be noted, however, that the sentencing judge might not order
a high fine even in the absence of a charitable contribution probation condition. Further-
more, a judge may order both a fine and a charitable contribution as conditions of proba-
tion. As a general rule, judges, utilizing the charitable contribution sanction, should also be
encouraged to require defendants to pay a fine to compensate the government. for costs
incurred in prosecuting the defendant. Moreover, since prosecution of corporate crime is
increasing, total government revenues from corporate criminal fines may not decrease due
to the use of this charitable contribution sanction in appropriate cases. See Coffee, "No Soul
to Damn: No Body to Kick," supra note 2, at 386; White-CollarJustice, supra note 20, at 3; Note,
supra note 2, at 367 (citing Note, Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate
Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1227, 1229).
35 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984).
36 Id. at 1550.
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wrote opinions concurring in result but dissenting as to holding
that charitable contributions were a per se invalid condition of pro-
bation. Judge Heaney stated that he would sustain payments to
charitable or educational institutions under certain guidelines.37
He noted that similar effective probation conditions are used fre-
quently for individual defendants38 and criticized the court for
"shutting the door on probationary conditions of this nature for
corporate defendants. '3 9 Judge Gibson 40 urged that the majority
erred in overruling United States v. William Anderson Co.,41 in which
the Eighth Circuit had affirmed charitable contributions as a condi-
tion of probation. He criticized the majority's statutory interpreta-
tion 42 and distinguished Anderson from Missouri Valley and other
cases upon which the majority relied. 43 Judge Gibson argued that
charitable contributions could play a "valuable role . . . in corpo-
rate probation." 44
As this debate on the validity of charitable contributions as a
condition of corporate probation continued, Congress passed the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
II. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 is part of the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act of 1984.4 5 It repealed the Federal Proba-
tion Act. 46 New provisions for probation were integrated
37 Id. at 1551. According to judge Heaney, the judge must carefully avoid any conflicts
of interest. When establishing an endowed chair, the court must ensure that posterity will
understand the chair was established to punish illegal conduct. Id. (Heaney, C.J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
38 Id.
39 Id. Judge Heaney stated that the statute did not require these limitations. He felt
the majority was motivated by "a shortsighted effort to protect government revenues...
and. . . out of an inordinate fear that our district court judges will not have the wisdom to
avoid possible conflicts of interest." Id.
40 Judge Heaney joined in Judge Gibson's opinion.
41 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982); see note 18 supra.
42 Judge Gibson stated that the permissive language of the statute dictated a broad
interpretation. 741 F.2d at 1551-53 (Gibson, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
43 Judge Gibson found Anderson distinguishable because in Anderson, unlike Missouri Val-
/ey, the corporate defendants were making their payments to charities for which their of-
ficers and employees had been sentenced to perform community service. He suggested
that funding may be the way corporations perform community service. See id. at 1553-54.
Judge Gibson stated it was an abuse of discretion to allow the corporate defendant to
choose a favorite charity to receive the probation condition funds. Id. at 1554-55.
44 Id. at 1554.
45 See note 11 supra. The Act was passed on October 12, 1984. All pertinent portions
of the Act, with the exception of those portions regarding the Sentencing Commission, will
take effect on November 1, 1986. That portion of the Act establishing the Sentencing Com-
mission took effect on the date of enactment, October 12, 1984. The guidelines and policy
statements of the Commission will take effect within 2 years of the enactment date, pending
congressional review. Sentencing Reform Act, supra note 8, § 235 (98 Stat.), at 2031-33.
46 Id. § 212(2) (98 Stat.), at 1987.
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throughout the Sentencing Act47 which explicitly states that organi-
zational defendants may be sentenced48 to probation.49
In deciding whether to sentence a defendant to probation and
what probation conditions to require, courts must consider the na-
ture and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteris-
tics of the offender, and the purposes of sentencing. 50 The statute
divides the conditions of probation to be imposed into mandatory
and discretionary conditions. 51 At least one of the following discre-
tionary conditions must be imposed if the defendant is convicted of
47 The main probation provisions are in Chapter 227, subchapter B. Id. at 1992-95 (to
be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3561-66).
48 Under the Sentencing Reform Act, probation constitutes a sentence. Under the Fed-
eral Probation Act, probation was imposed by the court after it had suspended sentence. S.
REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 160.
The fact that probation now constitutes a sentence instead of a sanction imposed after
suspension of sentence may help mitigate the impression that corporate defendants or-
dered to pay a charitable contribution are "getting off easy." See note 32 supra and accom-
panying text. Eliminating this impression is important because in order to be effective,
criminal sentencing must not only be fair, it must also appear fair. See White-CollarJustice,
supra note 20, at 6. Of course to erase this impression of "getting off easy," courts must
emphasize that the charitable contribution sanction constitutes a sentence and either im-
pose it in addition to other sanctions or require the amount of the contribution to be com-
parable to the fine that would be imposed in the case.
In addition, since the court, under the Sentencing Reform Act, now orders the charita-
ble contribution sanction without first suspending a previously imposed fine, the argument
that the court is usurping the legislature's authority to disburse treasury funds is considera-
bly weakened. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. One can argue that if a fine was
never imposed and then suspended, funds were never, in effect, put into the treasury and
subsequently transferred elsewhere.
Moreover, because Congress has given courts the authority to impose a charitable con-
tribution probation condition by statute (Sentencing Reform Act, supra note 8, at 1993-94
(to be codified, at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b)(13) and 20)), the issue of courts usurping the legis-
lature's power to disburse treasury funds does not arise. See notes 55-60 infra and accompa-
nying text.
49 Sentencing Reform Act, supra note 8, at 1988 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3551(c)(1)).
50 Id. at 1989 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1)-(2)). The Act states:
The Court, in determing the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider-
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and char-
acteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effec-
tive manner.
51 Id. at 1993-94 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a), (b)). The provision states:
(a) MANDATORY CONDrrIONs.-The court shall provide, as an explicit condi-
tion of a sentence of probation-
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(1) for a felony, a misdemeanor, or an infraction, that the defendant not
commit another Federal, State, or local crime during the term of probation;
and
(2) for a felony, that the defendant also abide by at least one condition
set forth in subsection (b)(2), (b)(3), or (b)(13).
(b) DISCRETIONARY CONDmONs.-The court may provide, as further condi-
tions of a sentence of probation, to the extent that such conditions are reasonably
related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2) and to the extent
that such conditions involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as are
reasonably necessary for the purposes indicated in section 3553(a)(2), that the
defendant-
(1) support his dependents and meet other family responsibilities;
(2) pay a fine imposed pursuant to the provisions of subchapter C;
(3) make restitution to a victim of the offense pursuant to the provisions
of section 3556;
(4) give to the victims of the offense the notice ordered pursuant to the
provisions of section 3555;
(5) work conscientiously at suitable employment or pursue conscien-
tiously a course of study or vocational training that will equip him for suitable
employment;
(6) refrain, in the case of an individual, from engaging in a specified oc-
cupation, business, or profession bearing a reasonably direct relationship to
the conduct constituting the offense, or engage in such a specified occupation,
business, or profession only to a stated degree or under stated circumstances;
(7) refrain from frequenting specified kinds of places or from associating
unnecessarily with specified persons;
(8) refrain from excessive use of alcohol, or any use of a narcotic drug or
other controlled substance, as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act (21 U.S.C. 802), without a prescription by a licensed medical prac-
tioner;
(9) refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other dan-
gerous weapon;
(10) undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment,
including treatment for drug or alcohol dependency, as specified by the court,
and remain in a specified institution if required for that purpose;
(11) remain in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons during nights, week-
ends, or other intervals of time, totaling no more than the lesser of one year
or the term of imprisonment authorized for the offense in section 3581(b),
during the first year of the term of probation;
(12) reside at, or participate in the program of, a community corrections
facility for all or part of the term of probation;
(13) work in community service as directed by the court;
(14) reside in a specified place or area, or refrain from residing in a speci-
fied place or area;
(15) remain within the jurisdiction of the court, unless granted permis-
sion to leave by the court or a probation officer;
(16) report to a probation officer as directed by the court or the proba-
tion officer;
(17) permit a probation officer to visit him at his home or elsewhere as
specified by the court;
(18) answer inquiries by a probation officer and notify the probation of-
ficer promptly of any change in address or employment;
(19) notify the probation officer promptly if arrested or questioned by a
law enforcement officer; or
(20) satisfy such other conditions as the court may impose.
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a felony:5 2 "pay a fine," "make restitution," or "work in community
service as directed by the court."5 3 Considering the characteristics
of corporate defendants, one method, perhaps the most effective
method,54 by which corporations can "work in community service"
is by funding projects. Charitable contributions can be a means for
coporations to meet this probation condition.55
Moreover, the widely expanded list of conditions, including
"other conditions as the court may impose," 56 clearly indicates the
list is exemplary not exclusive. The legislative history repeatedly
emphasizes that courts have authority to impose any other proba-
tion conditions which may be appropriate for a particular of-
fender.57 Courts should allow the facts of the particular case to
suggest probation conditions that will foster the goals of sentenc-
ing: just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilita-
tion.58 Charitable contributions can help meet these goals for
corporate defendants. A court-ordered payment to charity should
be as effective as a fine in punishing the corporate offender and
deterring future violations by that offender and other corpora-
tions.59 If the charitable contribution in some way serves to focus
52 Id. at 1993 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(2)).
53 Id. at 1993 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(2), (3), (13)).
54 Corporations may perform community service most effectively by funding in those
instances where corporate personnel lack the skills or the corporation lacks the materials
needed by the community service project chosen by the court.
The legislative history of the Act indicates Congress did not intend courts to manage
organizations as a part of probation supervision. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 102. This
suggests that it may be preferable for corporations to perform community service by con-
tributing assets rather than contributing labor and materials because the former would re-
quire less court supervision than the latter. See Coffee, "'No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick,"
supra note 2, at 453.
55 Following this line of reasoning, charitable contributions could be imposed under
the Sentencing Reform Act, supra note 8, at 1993 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3563(b)(13)).
56 Id. at 1994 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(20)).
57 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 96.
The list is not exhaustive, and it is not intended at all to limit the court's options-
conditions of a nature very similar to, or very different from, those set forth may
also be imposed. . . .The conditions. . . are simply designed to provide the trial
court with a suggested listing of some of the available alternatives which might be
desirable in the sentencing of a particular offender. [footnote omitted] It is antici-
pated that. . . the court will review the listed examples in light of the Sentencing
Commission's guidelines and policy statements, weigh other possibilities sug-
gested by the case, and, after evaluation, impose those that appear to be appropri-
ate under all the circumstances.
Id. at 98.
58 Sentencing Reform Act, supra note 8, at 1989 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)).
59 Some commentators have criticized corporate charitable contributions as having the
same drawbacks as fines in that corporations can pass the cost on to shareholders or con-
sumers. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. Prof. Coffee has proposed that courts
require corporations to pay equity fines, transferring corporate equity instruments instead
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the corporation on its wrongdoing and remedying that wrong, it
may also promote rehabilitation. Under the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, charitable contributions can be imposed as a condition
of probation for corporate defendants. 60 In appropriate cases, they
could be a very effective sanction.
Procedural provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act will pre-
vent abuse of this sanction by ensuring that it is imposed only in
appropriate cases. These procedural provisions include the pre-
sentence report, Sentencing Commission guidelines, and appellate
review.
The Act requires preparation of a presentence report focusing
on the unique characteristics of the defendant and the offense. 61
This report can be dispensed with only when the court finds that
the record contains sufficient information of this nature to enable it
to exercise its sentencing authority meaningfully. 62 The informa-
tion in the presentence report will provide the grist for the trial
judge's sentence selection mill. By focusing on the unique charac-
teristics of the corporate defendant and its offense, a judge impos-
ing a charitable contribution as a probation condition will be
guided to those charities that have a rational nexus63 to the of-
of cash. He argues that doing so would avoid or minimize the problem of a corporation
passing on the cost of its crime. Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick," supra note 2, at
413-24; Coffee, Making the Punishment Fit the Corporation, supra note 2, at 14-21. This idea
that corporations pay in equity instruments rather than cash could also be applied to the
corporate charitable contribution sanction. A large block of blue chip stock would be as
beneficial to a charitable organization as an equivalent cash contribution.
60 While it appears that courts can impose a charitable contribution as a condition of
probation under the Sentencing Reform Act, the relevant portion of the Act does not take
effect until November 1, 1986. In the interim courts are still governed by the Federal Pro-
bation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). At this point, one can only speculate on whether a
charitable contribution probation condition may be imposed during this interim period.
Courts, which have held this sanction to be outside the Federal Probation Act, based their
argument on inferred legislative intent that the statute be construed narrowly. See notes 21-
26 supra and accompanying text. Congress, in passing the Sentencing Reform Act, has ne-
gated this inference. See note 57 supra. Courts, however, also declined to impose the chari-
table contribution sanction on policy grounds. See notes 27-31 supra and accompanying
text. Procedural provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act can safeguard these policy con-
cerns. See notes 61-77 infra and accompanying text. But neither the Sentencing Commis-
sion's guidelines and policy statements nor the appellate review provisions are in effect at
this time. See note 45 supra. Therefore, courts may either continue to decline to impose this
sanction under the Federal Probation Act or courts, emboldened by clarified congressional
intent, may impose this sanction under the Federal Probation Act and build policy safe-
guards into the sanction when imposed.
61 Sentencing Reform Act, supra note 8, at 1988-89 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3552).
62 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 160.
63 A rational nexus would exist if the charity helped the same class of people as those
harmed by the corporation's offense, if the charity served to reverse the damage done by
the defendant's conduct, or if a reasonable relationship existed between the charity and the
corporation's illegal conduct. A similar test for beneficiaries of non-monetary community
service was proposed in United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1171
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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fender and the offense. This will minimize potential conflicts of in-
terest for the sentencing judge.
Chapter 58 of the Act establishes the United States Sentencing
Commission 64 and empowers it to promulgate sentencing guide-
lines and policy statements. 65 These guidelines and policy state-
ments are intended to promote consistency and coherence in the
federal sentencing system. 66 But Congress foresees that the guide-
lines will enhance rather than detract from individually tailored
sentences. 67 By proposing guidelines 68 and policy statements69 for
the use of charitable contributions as a condition of probation for
corporate defendants, the Sentencing Commission can safeguard 70
against potential judicial conflicts of interest and protect the courts
from public distrust and criticism.
The Act provides for appellate review of a sentence at the re-
quest of either the defendant or the government. 71 Furthermore,
the Act facilitates this appellate review by requiring the sentencing
judge to enter into the record his reasons for choosing a particular
sentence and to state which particular goals of sentencing he ex-
pects the sentence to achieve. 72 On review, the appellate court will
64 Sentencing Reform Act, supra note 8, at 2017 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. ch. 58).
The Commission shall be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. It shall consist of seven voting members and one nonvoting member. At least
three of the members shall be federal judges in regular active service. Not more than four
members shall be of the same political party. The Attorney General or his designee shall be
the nonvoting member. Id. § 991 (98 Stat.), at 2017-18. After the initial staggered terms,
members will serve for six years. Id. § 992 (98 Stat.), at 2018.
65 Id. at 2019-24 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994). Among the powers of the Com-
mission is the power to study the effectiveness of sentences imposed. Id. at 2025 (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(16)). The results of such studies conducted on novel condi-
tions of probation, such as court-ordered charitable contributions, can provide the impetus
for improved guidelines and policy statements.
66 Id. at 2018 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)).
67 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 54-56, 164.
68 The court is to be guided by these guidelines but, if the court feels aggravating or
mitigating factors which the Sentencing Commission did not consider are present in the
case at bar, the court is not bound by them. Sentencing Reform Act, supra note 8, at 1990
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3353(b)); see also S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 54-56, 153-
54.
69 The policy statements are less binding on the court than the guidelines. See S. REP.
No. 225, supra note 6, at 54, 170-71. For a list of proposed policy statement topics regard-
ing organizational defendant sentencing, see id. at 169.
70 Since the guidelines and policy statements are essentially advisory to the trial court,
see notes 68-69 supra, and yet a criterion by which the appellate court will review sentences,
Sentencing Reform Act, supra note 8, at 2012 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d)(2)-(3)),
the Commission will have to function for a few years before it is known exactly what force
the guidelines and policy statements will have.
71 Id. at 2011-13 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742). If the defendant feels the court
has arbitrarily imposed an inappropriate charitable contribution, he can seek review. If the
government feels the district court has been too lenient in imposing a charitable contribu-
tion or has abused its discretion in choosing the charity, the government can seek review.
72 Id. at 1990 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)).
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evaluate discretionary conditions of probation under the following
standard:73 (1) The condition must be reasonably related to (a) the
nature and circumstances of the offense, (b) the history and charac-
teristics of the offender, and (c) the Act's goals of sentencing.7
(2) If the condition involves deprivation of property, it must also be
reasonably necessary (not merely reasonably related) to carry out the
sentencing purposes. 75 (3) The condition should comply with any
guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commis-
sion for that particular condition of probation or type of offense. 76
Thus, appellate review can also ensure that charitable contributions
as a condition of probation are only imposed in a rational manner
in cases in which they further the goals of the criminal justice sys-
tem. This should prevent any appearance of unfairness 77 in the use
of this sanction and any concomitant criticism of the courts.
III. Proposed Guidelines
Although charitable contributions as a condition of probation
can legally be imposed under the Sentencing Reform Act and pro-
cedural provisions of the Act can safeguard policy concerns, guide-
lines are necessary to determine cases in which this sanction may be
appropriate. Today, there is increasing concern over corporate so-
cial responsibility, especially in regard to violations which threaten
public health and safety. 78 As the introductory hypothetical of Con-
glomerate Corporation suggests, this is one context within which
charitable contributions can most effectively be used as a condition
of corporate probation.
When public health and safety violations occur, the over-
whelming concern focuses on the victims. The Sentencing Reform
Act presumes restitution for the victims of crime. 79 In corporate
crimes, however, a victim often does not learn of his injury8" or has
73 See Id. at 2012 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d); see also S. REP. No. 225, supra
note 6, at 97, 157.
74 See note 14 supra.
75 Id.
76 Appellate courts will not reverse sentences outside the guidelines if the sentencing
judge gives valid reasons for imposing a sentence which differs, even radically, from the
guidelines. See Sentencing Reform Act, supra note 8, at 1990 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(b),(c)(2)); id. at 2012 (to be codified at 3742(d)(3)); see also S. REP. No. 225, supra
note 6, at 54-56, 153-54.
77 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 68; see also note 48 supra.
78 Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick," supra note 2, at 391, 450; Coffee, Making
the Punishment Fit the Corporation, supra note 2, at 4.
79 Sentencing Reform Act, supra note 8, at 1990 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)),
requires the sentencing court to give a reason whenever a sentence does not include an
order of restitution.
80 See Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick," supra note 2, at 390-91; Coffee, Making
the Punishment Fit the Corporation, supra note 2, at 8; White-Collar Justice, supra note 20, at 3, 5;
[Vol. 60:530
difficulty proving he was directly injured by the corporation's of-
fense.8 1 This is particularly true in cases, such as the hypothetical,
in which victims are not readily identifiable.8 2 Victims may not be
readily identifiable83 due to the widespread nature of the harm,8 4 a
delay in the manifestation of injury,8 5 or the fact that only a per-
centage of victims exposed to the danger will succumb to actual
harm.86
In addition, a charitable contribution may be an effective
method of making restitution whenever victims of an offense will
need ongoing services over time.87 This sanction may also be ad-
visable whenever an effective remedy for the corporate harm re-
quires a greater expenditure of money, effort, knowledge, or
materials than individual victims would acquire or could purchase
with the share of restitution awarded to them by the court.88 This
would occur whenever the harm to each individual is slight but the
aggregate harm to the community is great.89 Moreover, a charita-
ble contribution may be a way to indirectly compensate victims
Comment, The Economic Inefficiency of Corporate Criminal Liability, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 582, 597 (1982).
81 See McAdams, supra note 2, at 995.
82 The legislative history has suggested that community service may be an especially
useful condition of probation when restitution is inappropriate because "the victims cannot
be readily identified." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 101. As noted, a charitable contri-
bution is one way a corporation can perform community service. See also United States v.
Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1169 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
83 In cases where some victims are identifiable and others are not, courts can order
direct restitution to the identifiable victims and also order a contribution to an appropriate
charity. The charitable contribution could serve as a "safety net" for the unidentifiable
victims.
84 In the hypothetical problem, the harm from Conglomerate Corporation's conduct
was widespread in that all persons who had eaten the cereal and all persons who had been
in the geographical area of the Foods Division plant were exposed to the carcinogenic com-
pound. Considering the two year duration of Conglomerate Corporation's violations, the
number of people exposed to the substance was prodigious.
85 The people exposed to the carcinogen by Conglomerate Corporation's conduct may
not exhibit symptoms for years.
86 Of all the people whom Conglomerate Corporation caused to be exposed to the
carcinogen, only a percentage will eventually develop cancer. Other victims, having re-
ceived the same exposure, may never develop cancer.
87 An example of this type of situation would be one in which a corporation exposed
victims to a chemical which caused permanent kidney damage. These victims could require
dialysis treatment for the rest of their lives. Another example would be miners suffering
from Black Lung Disease due to the mining corporation's failure to provide adequate venti-
lation. These victims may require continuous inhalation therapy.
88 For example, if a corporation has caused widespread harm to the environment by
dumping toxic wastes, the cleanup effort can most effectively be mounted when resources
are amassed, mobilized and directed by one unit.
89 Cases in which corporate conduct has destroyed an ecosystem, such as marshland,
illustrate this situation. By violating federal pollution laws, a corporation could destroy a
waterfowl breeding area. Individual citizens of the community may not be able to prove
specific harm, but the community as a whole would have lost a valuable resource.
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when a corporation's nolo contendere plea makes collection of sub-
sequent civil damages less likely.90
In all of these cases, as long as a rational nexus exists between
the offense and the charity selected,9 1 the charity can function as a
conduit through which money passes from the corporate criminal
defendant to the victim. 92 In the Conglomerate Corporation hypo-
thetical, for example, the sentencing judge, in addition to whatever
other sanctions he decides to impose, should consider requiring
Conglomerate Corporation to make a sizeable contribution to char-
ities which support cancer research and medical care for cancer vic-
tims.9 3 While a somewhat indirect method of aiding the victims, it
appears to be a more equitable and efficient solution than requiring
Conglomerate Corporation to pay equal sums to all people ex-
posed to the carcinogenic compound through the corporation's of-
fenses. 94 The charitable contribution sanction also avoids the
90 The Sentencing Reform Act empowers judges to order a criminal defendant con-
victed of an offense involving fraud or other intentionally deceptive practices to give rea-
sonable notice and explanation of the conviction to the victims of the offense. Sentencing
Reform Act, supra note 8, at 1991 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3555). The purpose behind
this sanction is to enable victims, who otherwise may not know that they have been victim-
ized, to bring subsequent civil suits against the defendant for injuries suffered. In these
civil suits, defendant's prior criminal conviction would have collateral estoppel effect. See,
e.g., Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Frank, 494 F.2d 145
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 828 (1974); Cardillo v. Zyla, 486 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1973); see
also Note, supra note 34, at 1350-56.
Defendants at times thwart this collateral estoppel effect by pleading nolo contendere.
Coffe, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick," supra note 2, at 441-44; White-Collar Justice, supra
note 20, at 12. At times a defendant's nolo contendere plea may effectively prevent victims
from bringing a civil suit, either individually or as a class action. In these cases, courts
could consider ordering a contribution to a charity which would aid the victims, thus
achieving partial restitution.
Similarly, an order to pay a charitable contribution may be appropriate when victims
either individually or as a class would have difficulty proving the kind of loss recoverable in
a civil suit. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
91 See note 63 supra. Ifa contribution appears appropriate and no current charity meets
the rational nexus criterion, the court could order the corporation to endow a new founda-
tion to meet the needs created by its offense.
92 A similar conduit function could be served by the Crime Victims Fund. See Victims of
Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. XIV, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS (98 Stat.) 2170. In some cases, however,, a charity may be a more efficient conduit.
See note 93 infra.
93 In this hypothetical, a fine would be paid into the Crime Victims Fund. See note 92
supra. This Fund could make a grant to an eligible crime victim compensation program.
The program, in turn, could give money to those victims who could prove injury from the
corporation's illegal conduct. But a charity which engaged in cancer research and care of
cancer patients would be more accessible to victims since the charities aid all cancer pa-
tients. In addition, during the years between the court's ordering the contribution and the
victim's developing cancer, perhaps the money could have facilitated finding a cure or im-
proved treatment. The direct charitable contribution could also be a more efficient conduit
because the transaction costs would be lower than in the Crime Victims Fund's multi-step
process.
94 If the corporation were required tj pay present restitution only in the amount of
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administrative quagmire of attempting to identify all individuals
who ingested or inhaled the compound due to Conglomerate Cor-
poration's conduct.95 Is a charitable contribution an ideal solution
to widespread harm caused by corporate criminal conduct? No, but
at least it is a step towards accomplishing the impossible.
IV. Conclusion
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 provides a comprehensive
and cohesive federal sentencing system which will allow courts to
impose charitable contributions as a condition of probation for cor-
porate criminal defendants. The procedural requirements of the
new federal sentencing system will prevent potential abuses of this
sanction. This sanction will not be appropriate for every corporate
criminal defendant. Nevertheless, in those cases where charitable
contributions are an appropriate condition of probation, they may
provide an effective means to achieve the goals of sentencing the
corporate offender.96
Mary Lou Howard
harm caused, one can conjecture that the court may compute the dollar figure for each
victim by multiplying a dollar value for the harm caused by getting cancer times the per-
centage chance that each person exposed will develop cancer. But trying to arrive at figures
to plug into this equation would be a judicial nightmare.
Apart from the judicial nightmare of trying to identify all the people exposed to the
carcinogen, to place a dollar figure on the damage of victims developing cancer, and to
determine what percentage of the victims will develop cancer at some future time, compen-
sating all victims equally would be neither equitable nor efficient. This would not be equi-
table because all victims have not suffered equal harm. Some victims, despite equal
exposure to the carcinogen, are more predisposed to developing cancer. In effect, their
exposure has caused them greater harm. This is analogous to the "eggshell skull" doctrine
of tort law. See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) oF TORTS § 16(1) comment 1, illustration 1 (1965).
In addition, compensating all victims equally would not be efficient. Victims who actually
develop cancer in the future would suffer losses greater than the amount of compensation
they had received. Dollars paid to those who never developed cancer could better compen-
sate for the corporation's violations if paid to the former group.
95 This proposed sanction admits the impossibility of the task. By ordering the charita-
ble contribution, the court abandons attempts to compensate particular victims and settles
for compensating the class of victims who have suffered like harm from whatever source. In
effect, for these special cases, the court acknowledges the impracticability of victim restitu-
tion and orders community restitution as a means of promoting the rehabilitative goal of
sentencing. See note 96 infra.
96 This sanction can meet the sentencing goals of just punishment, deterrence, and
rehabilitation. If the amount of the contribution adequately reflects the severity of the de-
fendant's offense, just punishment would be achieved. (If this sanction is imposed in addi-
tion to other sanctions, such as a fine, the amount of the contribution could be
correspondingly reduced.) Because this sentence would cause the defendant to pay out
assets, either in cash or equity instruments, see note 59 supra, both specific and general
deterrence could be achieved. Furthermore, while fines focus the defendant's attention on
its prosecutor, the government, court-ordered charitable contributions focus the defend-
ant's attention on its victim, that segment of the community which its illegal conduct has
harmed. This shift of focus may help to rehabilitate the corporate offender.
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